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Abstract: This paper provides a review of the research conducted on complex network analysis 
(CAN) in electric power systems. Moreover, a new approach is presented to find optimal locations 
for microgrids (MGs) in electric distribution systems (EDS) utilizing complex network analysis. The 
optimal placement in this paper points to the location that will result in enhanced grid resilience, 
reduced power losses and line loading, better voltage stability, and a supply to critical loads during 
a blackout. The criteria used to point out the optimal placement of the MGs were predicated on the 
centrality analysis selected from the complex network theory, the center of mass (COM) concept 
from physics, and the recently developed controlled delivery grid (CDG) model. An IEEE 30 bus 
network was utilized as a case study. Results using MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc., Nattick, MA, USA) 
and PowerWorld (PowerWorld Corporation, Champaign, IL, USA) demonstrate the usefulness of 
the proposed approach for MGs placement. 
Keywords: centralized control; complex network analysis (CNA); controlled delivery grid; grid 
resilience; microgrids placement 
 
1. Introduction 
Scientists in many fields have, through the years, established extensive tools, mathematical, 
computational, and probabilistic, aimed at scrutinizing, modeling, and understanding different 
networks. The study of network science predicated its basic foundations on the development of graph 
theory, which was early examined by Leonhard Euler in 1736, when he published the famous Seven 
Bridges of Königsberg paper [1]. In the context of the network theory, a complex network could be 
defined as a graph that is composed of relatively many mutually related nodes (e.g., structural or 
functional relation) [2,3]. It could also be defined as a network that has non-observable topological 
features that do not arise in simple networks such as random ones, but often occur in graph models 
of real systems [4]. Based on the former description, electric power systems can be classified as 
complex networks and investigated through the lens of CNA [5,6]. The electric power system is 
categorized one of the most critical infrastructures. It is going through significant changes driven by 
the aging of the centralized energy infrastructure while electricity demand is growing [7], and the 
worldwide determination to reduce CO2 emissions [8,9]. Moreover, recent natural disasters, such as 
Hurricane Sandy, exposed some of the power system’s weaknesses. Therefore, a national call to 
enhance the grid’s resilience and self-healing abilities was raised [10]. This led to the imperative 
upgrade to the “smart grid”, with a key role expected to be played by MGs. In order to maximize the 
benefits of MGs within the electric power system, MGs placement is an essential feature to examine. 
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Recently, many states have started to announce competitions and prizes regarding microgrid 
implementation to promote clean energy and increase grid resilience. For example, in July 2017, the 
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities decided to deploy 13 new MGs statewide in an attempt to 
maximize their resilience in the face of catastrophic weather events. The board president announced 
that the Board’s Town Center Distributed Energy Resource (DER) MG program is funding feasibility 
studies/research for 13 separate proposed town center MGs across New Jersey [11,12]. A similar prize 
in New York has been announced as well. Moreover, microgrid implementation is also driven by 
federal and state regulatory actions to encourage Non-Wire Solutions (NWS) and reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from new and existing power plants. In order to maximize the resilience of the 
electric power grid in these states during the planning stage, one main aspect should be considered 
and investigated, which is the microgrid’s placement. Microgrid locations will contribute to 
maximizing the power grid’s resilience during a blackout and should perform the following tasks: 
(1) supply most of the critical loads within the distribution network; (2) maintain voltage within 
acceptable limits; (3) operate within the line loading capacities; (4) and minimize system losses. In 
order to attempt to solve the aforementioned problem, one can think of a “trial and error” approach, 
i.e., if N-microgrids are to be implemented in an M-buses system, then we are looking at NM trails to 
determine the microgrid locations that will enhance the system resilience (e.g., implementing three 
microgrids in a 30 bus system will lead to 330 = 2.06 × 1014 trials). Not including the processing time, 
the whole procedure will require a tremendous amount of time to find optimal locations, especially 
in big systems. Therefore, another approach that can provide pointers regarding the plausible 
optimal locations should be explored. 
Preceding research concentrated on finding the optimal location of distributed generation within 
an MG using metaheuristic means to minimize network losses [13]. Some of the performed research 
used complex network similarity with the electric power system to look into transient stability 
assessment [5,6]. Others used game theory to economically investigate the transfer of energy between 
distributed energy resources within an intelligent distribution system [14]. Researchers in [15] tried 
to coordinate the injection of the reactive power of photovoltaic generators to regulate the 
distribution network voltage without having to integrate new components and consequently 
eliminate the additional costs. Also, research was conducted in [16] to find the optimal 
reconfiguration of a distribution network (i.e., self-sustainable islands/MGs or sub-area partitioning) 
to maximize the energy savings. In [17], the research was focused on managing the power exchange 
between MGs during emergencies to keep all of them operational. We used the CDG model 
developed in [18,19] to enhance the EDS resilience with a high penetration of MGs in [20]. The CDG 
model suggests full observability and control of the loads by a central controller (i.e., distribution 
system operator (DSO)) that processes “requests” (i.e., demands) from all loads and yield back 
“grants” (i.e., power) according to an energy management algorithm (EMA). 
In this paper, abstract and weighted complex network frameworks have been established for a 
modified IEEE 30 bus system, along with utilizing the COM concept and centrality analysis, to 
determine the plausible optimal locations to deploy microgrids within electric distribution systems. 
The real-time energy management based on the CDG model, presented in [20], was used as an 
operational EMA for the distribution system operator (DSO) to evaluate the resilience aspect of the 
proposed locations from the developed complex network framework. In other words, the EMA 
implemented in the DSO takes into account the operational conditions (e.g., voltage variations, 
congestion limits, etc.). The input to the DSO is the available energy from the MGs and the load 
requests. The DSO tries to find the solution that has the fewest losses and highest grant/request ratio 
and is within the acceptable operational limits. Also, this paper aimed to provide an extensive review 
of previously conducted research that attempted to analyze the electric power system using complex 
networks theory. It should be mentioned that some practical limitations were not considered during 
the analysis such as the location availability. 
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2. Literature Survey 
We attempted to scrutinize the electric power systems from two main points of view: (1) an 
abstract perspective (i.e., as a graph consists from nodes and edges), regardless of the electric power 
aspects (e.g., transmission line impedances); (2) weighted graphs that blend an abstract 
understanding of complex network theories and electric power systems. 
2.1. Examining the Electric Power System from an Abstract Perspective 
Recent advancements in mapping the topology of abstract complex networks have revealed that 
a large segment of them are extremely heterogeneous with respect to the degree of the nodes (i.e., the 
number of edges connected directly to a node) [21]. In complex networks, most of the nodes have a 
low degree, but there is a continuous hierarchy of high degree nodes called “hubs”, which play a 
significant role in the network. According to the node degree distribution of the complex network, 
the system can be classified as a scale-free or single-scale network. Scale-free networks have most of 
their nodes with a low degree and some nodes are hubs; the node degree distribution of these 
networks follows a power law P(k)~k−γ with an exponent γ that mostly ranges between a value of two 
and three, where k is the node degree. Single-scale networks, in the context of power systems indicate 
that there is a path of transmission lines (TLs) between any power plant and any distribution 
substation; these networks can be considered regular networks where every node has roughly the 
same degree. Scientists examining and assessing the vulnerabilities of complex networks are usually 
interested in deciding whether the system understudy is a single-scale or scale-free network. One of 
the reasons is that, for example, scale-free networks are more resilient to the random disconnection 
of nodes; however, they are vulnerable to targeted attacks on hubs [22–24]. 
From a power system perspective, it is very important to examine whether the connectivity of 
the electric power grid is dependent on a small set of hubs and if their disconnection might initiate 
an extensive obstruction of the power transmission capabilities (e.g., a blackout). 
Researchers in [21] investigated the North American power grid from an abstract complex 
network point of view and tried to determine its ability to transfer power between generation and 
distribution when specific nodes are disconnected. The work attempted to model this power grid 
based on the data stored in the mapping system developed by Platts [25]. This mapping system 
comprises data regarding every power plant, major substation, and 115–765 kV TLs of the North 
American power grid. The model developed represents the North American electric grid as a 
network that contains approximately 14,000 nodes (i.e., substations) and 19,000 edges (i.e., 
transmission lines). Some of the significant findings of this work are as follows: 
- The cumulative degree distribution of the North American grid follows an exponential function 
P(k > K)~e−0.5K, which agrees with that of the Western power grid that is categorized as a single-
scale network. 
- The cumulative betweenness node distribution follows P(l > L)~(2500 + L)−0.7. The betweenness 
(l) of a node in a network is defined as the number of shortest paths that pass through it [26,27]. 
Assuming that the power is sent through the shortest route, the betweenness of a substation 
could be considered as an indication of how much energy passes through it. The calculated 
betweenness node distribution demonstrates that almost 40% of the substations are part of tens 
and hundreds of shortest paths, while 1% of the substations lie on a million or more shortest 
paths. These high betweenness substations, even though they may not be considered hubs, have 
a significant role in power transmission. 
- To ensure the reliability of the loads being continuously supplied, the transmission network of 
the electric power grid was designed in such a way that there is more than a single electrical line 
between any two substations. In an attempt to verify whether the North American grid topology 
has this characteristic of global redundancy or has vanished through the grid expansions, the 
authors presented a measure of the network redundancy called the “edge range”. This measure 
is defined as the distance between the ends of an edge if the edge linking them was removed 
[28]. It was found that around 900 TLs connecting generators and/or transmission substations 
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are radial. These radial TLs represent a clear weakness, as their disconnection isolates their 
endpoints and subsequently creates islanded clusters in the electric power grid. 
- Degree-based and random disconnection of nodes was performed to examine the connectivity 
loss percentage, which quantifies the average reduction in the number of generators connected 
to a specific distribution substation. Through this experiment, it was found that the elimination 
of generating substations does not change the overall connectivity of the grid due to the high 
level of redundancy at the generating substation level. However, the situation can be radically 
different when the substations being disconnected were transmission substations. For accidental 
or random disconnection, the connectivity loss is considerably low and remains proportional to 
the number of nodes that got disconnected. On the other hand, the connectivity loss is 
significantly increased when high betweenness or high degree transmission hubs are 
disconnected. In their conclusion, the electric grid can endure only a few failures of this type 
before substantial parts of the grid become separated, leading to a significant connectivity loss 
at the distribution level. For example, the failure of 4% of the substations that have high 
betweenness might lead to a 60% loss of connectivity in the grid. 
Similar work was conducted on the Italian power grid for the 220 and 380 kV transmission lines, 
which includes 341 substations and 517 transmission lines [29]. The aim of the study was to show 
that the structure of the power grid could reveal important information regarding the vulnerability 
of the network under cascading failures. In this study, the weights of the transmission lines were 
updated after disconnecting a node or line such that if the load in a line exceeds its capacity, the 
weight will be varied by a factor equal to the capacity divided by the line loading. The calculated 
cumulative node degree distribution of the Italian grid was calculated to be equal to 2.5 e−0.55k and the 
cumulative betweenness node distribution follows (785 + l)−1.44, which indicates that this grid is very 
homogeneous regarding the node degree distribution and shows a high heterogeneity in the nodes’ 
betweenness. The authors found that the node degree and betweenness are not correlated and that 
the failure of high betweenness nodes is more significant and could lead to large-scale blackouts. 
Moreover, they studied the impact of increasing the line capacity (e.g., 1.2~1.5 times) on the initiation 
of a cascading failure and found that there was no substantial difference in the results. Following the 
same type of scrutiny, Casals et al. [30] examined the structural topology of the European electric grid 
and its tolerance to targeted and accidental failures. In another work, Sole et al. [31] explored the 
fragility of the European electric power grid under targeted attacks, where specific substations in the 
network were disconnected and the patterns of failures were analyzed. Coelho et al. conducted the 
same analysis on a Brazilian test system [32]. 
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz proposed the small-world phenomenon in network models. The 
small-world networks exhibit a high clustering coefficient similar to that in regular networks and a 
small average distance like random networks. Through the formulation procedure of the small-world 
network, it is noticeable to see that it is the few long edges (i.e., edges that connect nodes to another 
far away ones) that make small-world networks different from both random and regular networks. 
The main reason is that nodes’ distances have been significantly shortened since the shortest paths 
generally pass through those long edges. As a result, the nodes connected by long edges in the 
network have higher betweenness centrality than of the other nodes. Also, in case these nodes are 
being disconnected intentionally (e.g., attacked) the structure of the network should greatly changes 
(e.g., more islands might be created) [33]. Researchers in [34] analyzed the north part of the Chinese 
national grid and found that the normalized distribution of the lengths of its shortest paths is similar 
to that of the West State Power Grid (WSPG) in the United States and tried to show it is a small-world 
network as well. 
Most of these studies focus only on the abstract structure of the power grid using node degree 
distribution and betweenness distribution, which introduces substantial insight regarding the 
vulnerability assessment of the grid. Also, these studies are considered a foundational building block 
in establishing theoretical probability models for the cascading failures research in the power grids. 
Other research tried to examine whether the electric power grid understudy is a small-world 
phenomenon by utilizing the properties of centrality and path lengths in an attempt to study the 
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vulnerability of the system and its tendency to form islands [35–37]. However, no cohesive study on 
an electric power grid has been conducted that keeps all of these parameters in perspective through 
the analysis. 
Through these types of studies, the category of the grid structure could be identified from the 
complex network perspective (e.g., single-scale, scale-free). This classification might help the electric 
power system engineers in the planning stage or while upgrading the infrastructure (e.g., add a new 
transmission line) to maintain a proper redundancy level in the transmission system. 
2.2. Scrutinizing the Electric Power System Utilizing Weighted Graphs 
Numerous measures/indices could be developed that could specify certain features of the 
network, if the structure of the network is known. Social scientists have used some centrality indices 
[38–41] to better explain a person’s impact within a network. Among these centrality indices, the most 
widely used in the electric power systems are degree centrality and betweenness centrality, as 
mentioned earlier. However, for further in-depth analysis, selected electric power system parameters 
need to be included (e.g., relate the weight of the edges to a group of electric power system properties) 
according to the type of study being conducted [42]. 
Ian Dobson from Iowa State University is considered one of the pioneers in investigating power 
system blackouts initiation and propagation using probabilistic complex network analysis models 
and finding the feature of self-organized criticality of the electric power grid [43–48]. Motter and Lai 
[28] showed how the redistribution of loads on substations due to the failure of certain important 
substations or TLs can result in a cascading failure. Dwivedi and Yu explore the idea of vulnerability 
analysis of power systems using maximum power flow-based centrality in [49]; the study was done 
on the IEEE 39 bus system. Their work presented a new direction for identifying important links in 
structural vulnerability analysis [50]. Nasiruzzaman et al. in [51] attempted to identify the critical 
nodes within the system using the conventional centrality measures of complex networks and the 
line weights were based on the electric grid impedances and power flow. Moreover, Nasiruzzaman 
and Pota in [5] conducted transient stability assessment utilizing the betweenness index and the 
power flow as the weight of the lines. Also, Chen et al. [52] introduced a bus admittance matrix into 
the traditional topological model, as weights of the TLs, for the purpose of further studying power 
grid vulnerability. Arianos et al. [53] presented a complex network-based parameter called net-ability 
to evaluate the performance of power grids during normal operation. Fang et al. in [54] investigated 
the cascading failure behavior using directed complex networks. They performed two attack 
strategies on the IEEE 118 bus network, namely “minimum in-degree”, which refers to the intentional 
attack to the input link of the node with the minimum in-degree; and “maximum out-degree”, which 
refers to the intentional attack on the input link of the node with the maximum out-degree. Their 
work concluded the following: (1) the cascading failure impact could be minimized by increasing the 
line capacity by a tolerance factor; and (2) an initial small-scale fault may result in a complete power 
outage of the network when the tolerance factor is small. 
All the aforementioned efforts have shed light on exploring the electric power system from a 
new perspective through the complex network lens, which led to significant findings, especially 
regarding grid vulnerability assessments. However, there is no commonly accepted approach that 
involves complex network analysis in conventional power system analysis. 
In subsequent sections, the use of complex network analysis to find a plausible optimal location 
to implement microgrids within a distribution system will be demonstrated. 
3. System Understudy 
The system being studied is presented in Figure 1. It shows the IEEE 30 bus system. The buses 
and lines data were extracted from [55]. The network was altered to represent a power outage 
condition by removing the main infeed from the grid. The network is divided into three areas, namely 
Areas 1, 2, and 3, each with a different load profile, as can be seen in Figure 1. The aggregated demand 
is 283.4 MW, and 126.2 MVar. We assumed that the three MGs are connected to the system at three 
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different buses. The rated available apparent power during the 24 h, {Pi, Qi}, for these three MGs is 
{80, 50}, {80, 30} and {50, 20} MW and MVar, respectively. 
 
Figure 1. Modified IEEE 30 bus system. 
Each bus has a local controller. These controllers, in the case of load buses, send load requests to 
the DSO and also have the ability to execute load shedding on their controllable loads. In the case of 
microgrid buses, these local controllers represent the Microgrid Central Controllers (MGCCs) and 
send generation permissions as shown in Figure 2. The microgrid could represent a group of 
resources (wind turbines, solar farm, diesel generators, etc.) along with energy storage systems 
(batteries, flywheels, etc.). Also, it could be thought of as a cluster of MGs managed by one controller. 
The DSO does not need to have prior knowledge about the details of the MGs. The MGCC checks its 
resources and loads then only send a signal representing the possible available power that the MG 
could supply. The footprint of the IEEE 30 bus system is more than 100 km2 [56]. A single microgrid 
could supply several megawatts, such as UCSD MG in California, which supplies ~31.2 MW to a 4 
km2 campus; New York University MG, which has a capacity of 13.4 MW to supply 22 buildings; and 
Illinois Institute of Technology MG, which has a collective DERs capacity close to 9 MW [57]. 
 
Figure 2. Grant/request process in the distribution network. 
The central controller (i.e., DSO) executes the EMA in [20]. The brute force algorithm looks for a 
solution that agrees with all the constraints (i.e., acceptable voltage limits, line capacities and 
minimum losses) and allows all the requested demands to be granted. If the algorithm does not find 
a possible solution, it has to find another solution, with some of the requests not being fully supplied 
(i.e., load shedding). It was assumed that each bus controller will send a demand request, in the form 
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of a signal that comprises four load levels with a 10% difference or more. The grant signal from the 
DSO will be based on a priority list in [20]. The priority has been assigned such that Area 3 has the 
lowest priority and Area 1 has the highest. In other words, the DSO will try to grant all the requested 
demands. If that is not feasible, it will execute the brute force algorithm for a reduced demand, based 
on their priorities. In this paper, the locations of the MGs that will enhance the DSO operation will be 
further scrutinized using the complex networks framework, which will be explained in the 
subsequent section. 
4. Complex Network Framework 
In order to inspect an electric grid utilizing the CNA, the first step is to model this grid as a graph 
(i.e., TLs as edges and the buses as nodes). Figure 3 displays the equivalent graph of the IEEE 30 bus 
network. It contains 30 nodes (i.e., vertices) and the TLs are shown by 41 edges, which link the network 
nodes. Through this paper, we tried to use the complex network framework in the grid abstract form 
(i.e., undirected and unweighted) to learn about the central buses/nodes from a connectivity point of 
view. Moreover, we used different weights for the network edges (i.e., TLs) to understand the impact 
of electric system parameters such as normalized impendences and the centrality of nodes. Three main 
features were chosen to understand the nodes’ centrality in the IEEE 30 bus network: the clustering 
coefficient, betweenness and closeness centrality. Betweenness centrality could be defined as the 
number of shortest paths between all vertices (i.e., buses) that go through this vertex. It is utilized as a 
main measure of centrality [58] (i.e., a node with higher betweenness will have more impact over the 
system). The weights of the edges in betweenness were selected to be the normalized admittance of the 
TLs such that it becomes more correlated to the network power flow. In other words, the greater the 
lines admittances linked to a node, the greater the odds that the power will flow through this node. 
Betweenness can be calculated using Equation (1): 
𝑐(𝑣) =  ∑
𝑛𝑠𝑡(𝑣)
𝑁𝑠𝑡
𝑠,𝑡≠𝑢   , (1) 
where nst(v) is the number of shortest paths between vertices s and t that pass by the vertex v, and Nst 
is the overall number of shortest paths between vertices s and t. Closeness centrality could be defined 
as the average of the shortest paths between specific node and the rest of the nodes in the network 
[59]. The increase in node closeness indicates how near it is to the other nodes. The shortest electric 
route is the one that has the minimum resistance. Therefore, the edges’ weights were chosen to be the 
normalized impedance, since closeness is more associated with distance. Closeness can be calculated 







 , (2) 
where vi is the number of nearby vertices from vertex i (not including i), N is the number of vertices 
in any graph G, and Ci is the overall sum of distances from vertex i to all nearby vertices. If there is 
no path from vertex i to the nearby vertices, then c(i) is zero. 
The clustering measure is an index that evaluates which vertices in a graph will cluster together. 
The local clustering coefficient (LCC) of a node computes the average connections of its nearby nodes. 











𝑖=1    , (4) 
where Nv is the number of edges between vertex v nearby nodes and Kv is the vertex degree. 








Figure 3. Shows the IEEE 30 bus network: (a) graph; (b) Closeness centrality; (c) Betweenness 
centrality. 
The LCC was calculated to examine the clustering tendency of the IEEE 30 bus. In addition, from 
the power system point of viewpoint, a bus having a high CC might indicate that if it gets separated, 
the power flow will have alternative paths to the nearby buses. In other words, a high LCC could 
indicate a less central bus, but this is not enough as a self-indicator. The overall CC was calculated for 
the 30 bus system as 0.234. It is equal to one (i.e., clique [60]) if all the vertices in the graph are linked 
to one another. 
It can be observed from the CNA in Table 1 that buses 4, 6 and 10 have more effect than the 
others. It can also be seen in Figure 3b,c. However, if the COM analogy is utilized to find the load 
center using Equations (5) and (6), bus number 5 will be the closest one to the load center. In the next 
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  , (6) 
where xl and yl are the coordinates of loads center, Li is the load associated with bus i, and n is the 
number of buses in the system. Weighted closeness centrality. 












|Z| Abstract - 1/|Z| Abstract - - 
1 0.03757 0.009346 0.023458 2 1 1.5 0 
2 0.04114 0.012346 0.026743 28 40.5 34.25 0.166667 
3 0.037896 0.009901 0.023898 0 4 2 0 
4 0.051342 0.013333 0.032338 126 89.75 107.875 0.166667 
5 0.04297 0.009346 0.026158 34 1 17.5 0 
6 0.052748 0.015152 0.03395 208 176.5833 192.2917 0.142857 
7 0.049101 0.01087 0.029985 57 8.5 32.75 0 
8 0.036862 0.011364 0.024113 0 0 0 1 
9 0.038094 0.012195 0.025145 28 28 28 0.333333 
10 0.047808 0.013889 0.030848 161 115.6667 138.3333 0.133333 
11 0.026385 0.009091 0.017738 0 0 0 0 
12 0.048605 0.012048 0.030326 125 87.5 106.25 0.1 
13 0.032721 0.009009 0.020865 0 0 0 0 
14 0.04005 0.009804 0.024927 0 0 0 1 
15 0.045568 0.011111 0.02834 81 54 67.5 0.166667 
16 0.040794 0.010101 0.025447 8 10.41667 9.208333 0 
17 0.041507 0.011111 0.026309 18 15.91667 16.95833 0 
18 0.040242 0.009174 0.024708 23 11.41667 17.20833 0 
19 0.03232 0.009174 0.020747 4 11.41667 7.708333 0 
20 0.035456 0.010753 0.023104 7 26.25 16.625 0 
21 0.031265 0.010638 0.020952 0 0 0 1 
22 0.037667 0.011765 0.024716 42 34.91667 38.45833 0.333333 
23 0.036848 0.010309 0.023579 24 31.25 27.625 0 
24 0.030453 0.011111 0.020782 54 56.41667 55.20833 0 
25 0.025163 0.010101 0.017632 37 48.83333 42.91667 0 
26 0.017861 0.007874 0.012868 0 0 0 0 
27 0.024411 0.010638 0.017525 54 76.83333 65.41667 0.166667 
28 0.044617 0.012346 0.028481 63 72.83333 67.91667 0.333333 
29 0.019412 0.008264 0.013838 0 0 0 1 
30 0.020425 0.008264 0.014345 28 0 14 1 
5. Results and Analysis 
The MG placements decided by the CNA and the COM (i.e., placed in between the most loaded 
buses) have been evaluated utilizing the IEEE 30 bus system in Figure 1. The network is undergoing 
a blackout that happened as a result of the disconnection of the main infeed from bus 1. Three 
different sets of places for the MGs were chosen to demonstrate their effect on the real-time EMA 
based on the CDG model in [21] and the resilience of the EDS. 
The COM analogy showed that the load center is near to bus 5, and therefore buses 5, 3 and 10 
were chosen to be the set of places/locations (L1) to connect the three MGs. Buses 3 and 10 were 
chosen alongside bus 5 to assure that the MGs are spread over the IEEE 30 bus system. Sets of places 
(L2) were chosen to be buses 27, 29 and 30, which have the highest CC according to CNA. Set of places 
(L3) were chosen to be buses 4, 6, and 10, which have the highest betweenness and closeness 
centralities among the other buses, as explained in Section 4. 
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of locating the MGs at L1. Figure 4a–c depicts the normalized 
requested demands, and the power granted for 24 h at Areas 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The number of 
the bus selected by the EMA to be the swing bus is displayed hourly. Similarly, Figures 5 and 6 show 
the impact of locating the MGs at L2 and L3, respectively. 
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Figure 7a–c further show in details the yield factor through the 24 h in Area 1, 2 and 3 when the 
MGs were located at L1, L2, and L3 locations, respectively. Figure 7a shows that the yield factor of 
Area 1 among the three locations L1, L2, and L3 is comparable because Area 1 has the highest priority 
to be granted power. Also, the average yield factors of Area 1 for L1, L2, and L3 are 85.5%, 85.49%, 
and 87.31%. Figure 7b shows that for Area 2, the L2 MGs location has the lowest hourly yield factor 
and that of L3 is the highest. The average yield factors of Area 2 for L1, L2, and L3 are 82.6%, 61.57%, 
and 84.7%. Figure 7c demonstrates that L3 has the highest hourly yield factor for Area 3. The average 
yield factors of Area 3 for L1, L2, and L3 are 62.6%, 56%, and 79.3%. The overall average yield factor 
of the IEEE 30 bus system for L1, L2, and L3 MGs locations are 76.9%, 67.68%, and 83.76%. Figure 7d 
shows that L3 has the highest overall hourly yield factor in the IEEE 30 bus system. The overall 
average yield factors for the whole distribution network for locations L1, L2 and L3 are 76.89%, 
67.68%, and 83.76%. These results show that with the MGs deployed at L3, which is suggested by the 
centrality analysis, more loads (~30 MW) could be supplied during a blackout within the permissible 
operational network limits. For further information about the detailed operation of the MGCC, the 
authors have other related work in [61–68]. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper is a cohesive review of the application of complex network analysis in electrical 
power systems and sheds light on gaps that can be explored in future research. Moreover, this paper 
introduced a new methodology to inspect and analyze EDSs using CNA in a complex network 
framework to obtain pointers about the probable optimal locations/places to implement/connect 
MGs. The examination was executed utilizing CNA, the COM concept, and the controlled delivery 
grid (CDG) model. The IEEE 30 bus system was utilized to inspect the rationality and practicality of 
the suggested approach. It is worth mentioning that investigating all potential solutions to 
place/allocate an M no. of MGs in an N busses EDS needs enormous time and impractically large 
processing power. Complex network theory displays considerable advantages regarding finding the 
optimal location of MGs in an EDS to enhance its resilience. 
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